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1. Introduction
The introduction of the euro in 1999 was assumed to lead to macroeco-
nomic convergence between the countries participating in the eurozone. In
practice, imbalances between euro area countries have systematically grown
in the first decade of the euro’s existence. Holinski et al. (2012) and Jaumotte
and Sodsriwiboon (2010) empirically document divergent developments in
competitiveness as well as the emergence of large accumulated current ac-
count surpluses in the Northern part of the eurozone and deficits in the South-
ern part. In addition, these authors show that persistent current account
imbalances within the eurozone are primarily due to cross-country hetero-
geneity in gross private saving. In this paper, we empirically investigate the
determinants of cross-country saving to shed more light on the heterogeneity
between countries in general and between eurozone countries in particular.
In addition to the macroeconomic explanatory variables that are typically
used in the literature, we add a few institutional and cultural variables as
potential drivers of cross-country differences. It turns out that these variables
have a significant impact in explaining the cross-country heterogeneity.
The macroeconomic determinants of private saving have been extensively
studied in the past. Examples are Schmidt-Hebbel et al. (1992) and Edwards
(1996), who focus on developing countries and on Latin America, respec-
tively. Masson et al. (1998), Hussein and Thirlwall (1999) and Loayza et al.
(2000), include both industrial and developing countries. Finally Kessler
et al. (1993), Haque et al. (1999), De Serres and Pelgrin (2002) and Ramajo
et al. (2006) study the OECD countries, whereas Hondroyiannis (2006) exclu-
sively take European countries into account. Generally speaking, all of these
studies include measurements for income, inflation, uncertainty, fiscal pol-
icy, demographics, growth and foreign borrowing constraints as explanatory
variables. Depending on the focus of the study, other variables may have
been included as well.1 Empirically, different methods are used, including
cross-section analysis, panel analysis with static fixed effects (Masson et al.,
1998), instrumental variables (Edwards, 1996; Loayza et al., 2000), pooled
mean group estimation (Haque et al., 1999) and cointegration (Hondroyian-
nis, 2006).
To our knowledge, empirical evidence on the relationship between private
1Loayza et al. (2000) contains an overview of specifications and empirical results.
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saving and cultural variables is scarce.2 Carroll et al. (1994) and Carroll et al.
(1999) investigate saving differences among immigrants in Canada. Al-Awad
and Elhiraika (2003) look into saving behavior of immigrants in the United
Arab Emirates (UAE). Although none of these analyses find conclusive re-
sults, they claim that by looking at immigrants, they are able to capture the
effect of cultural background on saving.3 Guiso et al. (2006) take a broader
approach and investigate the effect of various cultural variables on a set of en-
dogenous economic variables. They provide suggestive evidence of a positive
relation between thrift and national saving.4
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on the determinants of pri-
vate saving by including cultural effects in addition to the standard macroe-
conomic variables. Focusing on the eurozone, we are simultaneously able
to increase our understanding of cross- country heterogeneity and diver-
gence. To increase the statistical power of our analysis, we use a set of
thirty OECD countries in our estimations. We use annual data for the pe-
riod 1990-2010. For the macroeconomic variables we gathered data from
AMECO, IMF, World Bank and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Our cul-
tural and institutional variables are obtained from the European and the
World Value Surveys.
This paper is set up as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief overview of
savings and investment heterogeneity for the eurozone countries. In Section
3, we discuss the data and the methodology employed in this paper. We
present our results in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5.
2. European Union imbalances
To discuss cross-country saving and investment heterogeneity in the eu-
rozone, we follow Holinski et al. (2012) and use the national account income-
expenditure identity, which states that gross national saving - the current
account - equals the sum of net private saving and net public saving. Similar
2See Beugelsdijk and Maseland (2011) for an introduction on the development of culture
as an area of study within the science of economics.
3See also e.g. Algan and Cahuc (2007), Algan and Cahuc (2010), and Ferna´ndez (2010).
4Related work by Barro and McCleary (2003), Mangeloja (2005), and McCleary and
Barro (2006) uses religion as a measurement of culture in order to investigate its effect
on economic outcomes. Knack and Keefer (1997), Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Tabellini
(2010) are examples of more general institutional determinants on economic performance.
See Efendic et al. (2010) for an overview.
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to Holinski et al. (2012), we divide the eurozone countries in a Northern and
a Southern group.5
Figure 1 shows that, on one hand, the Northern group had a consistent
and gradually rising current account surplus from the late 1990s till 2007.
The Southern countries, on the other hand, faced a consistently growing
current account deficit over the same period. Since the start of the global
financial crisis, these trends have been reversed, but the gap in current ac-
count balances is still sizable. Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate that most of the
cross-country dynamics in saving and investment come from the Southern
countries and, more particularly, from the development in Southern private
saving. To a lesser extent, Southern investment is seen to increase. Up un-
til the start of the financial crises, government balances increase throughout
the eurozone, though the Southern part is consistently lagging the Northern
part.6
Figure 1: Current account
In our view, the evidence strongly suggests that a better understanding
of the macroeconomic fundamentals of private saving is crucial. Potentially,
standard macroeconomic variables - including the greater access to financial
5North is defined as Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands; South is defined as Ireland, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain.
Holinski et al. (2012) did not include Belgium, France and Luxembourg in North nor Italy
and Slovakia in South.
6Similar evidence can be found in Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon (2010).
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Figure 2: Net Saving
Figure 3: Private Saving and Investment
4
markets and the decrease of risk premiums for Southern countries as a result
of the creation of the eurozone - may go a long way in explaining the observed
developments. However, according to Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon (2010)
euro and EMU dummies that differentiate between North and South remain
economically and statistically significant even when the obvious macroeco-
nomic fundamentals are included. For this reason, we hypothesize that other
variables that reflect cultural, behavioral and historical differences among
the eurozone countries may play a significant role too, as already suggested
by Holinski et al. (2012).
3. Data and methodology
In our analysis, we start with a base model that only includes standard
macroeconomic variables. Subsequently, we extend the model in various
directions, including cultural and institutional variables. Throughout the
paper, we employ pooled ordinary least square (OLS), with the exception
for one model where we employ fixed effect panel estimation. The main
advantage of the first approach is that it allows us to include variables that
have a small time variant component, as is the case for the cultural and
institutional dummy variables.7 Additionally, we include time dummies to
possibly control for business cycle movements of the macroeconomic data. To
attempt to control for endogeneity, we use the lagged disposable income and
the lagged net foreign assets instead of the variables themselves (Jaumotte
and Sodsriwiboon, 2010). We expect these two variables to have an important
role in determining the future level of private saving.
For our analysis we focus on the group of developed (OECD) countries8
- a list with countries is given in Table A.1 in the Appendix. We use annual
data from AMECO, the IMF and the Worldbank for the macroeconomic
variables over the sample period from 1990 until 2010 - see Table A.2 in the
Appendix for more information. The data on foreign assets are obtained
from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Cultural and institutional variables
7Note that pooled OLS theoretically is unable to establish causality relations, but only
provides evidence on the statistical relations between the dependent and the explanatory
variables.
8As a robustness check, we replicated the analysis for all countries in the AMECO
dataset, including the Eastern European countries and excluding all non-European coun-
tries. The results were qualitatively similar.
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are obtained from the European and World Value Surveys.
The variable private saving is constructed by subtracting public saving
from total saving. Public saving is defined as current revenue minus current
expenditure. Following Loayza et al. (2000) we use government budget9,
GDP growth, real disposable income, inflation, net foreign assets and the
dependency ratio as macroeconomic explanatory variables. Private saving,
government budget and net foreign assets are expressed in percentage of
GDP; income is given in purchase power parity per capita; GDP and inflation
are given in percentage growth rates while the dependency ratio is defined as
the ratio of people below 15 and above 64 years old divided by the number
of people between 15 and 65 years old, expressed as percentage.
We expect the private saving to partially offset the government deficit.
The usual economic reasoning applies here: a higher deficit is followed by
an increase in taxes or a cut in expenses and individuals anticipate that by
increasing their savings. GDP growth may affect private saving through the
income and the substitution effect. Which one dominates is dependent on
the level of development of the country. Theoretically, inflation should have
a positive effect on private saving. However, empirically the effect is not
always so clear - see Loayza et al. (2000).10 A higher dependency ratio leads
to lower aggregate saving since the rate of dissaving during retirement will
be higher than the rate of saving by the working population.
Since private saving is directly linked with the current account, we also
include net foreign assets. The effect of the net foreign assets is not straight-
forward. Economies with a high level of net foreign assets are able to run
deficits and can afford to save less, yielding a negative effect. However, these
economies also receive higher net-foreign income flows, which leads to a higher
income and possibly, higher saving. The opposite holds for economies with
low levels of net foreign assets. (Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon, 2010)
The descriptive summary of the variables is given in Table 1. The corre-
9The government budget is defined as revenue minus expenditure. A difference exists
between the government budget and public saving due to the inclusion of capital transfers
in total revenue and total expenditure. We neglect this difference, as is usual in the
literature.
10In the results presented here, we have left out possible interest rate effects. Preliminary
results yielded small and negative coefficients, possibly due to endogeneity issues. Other
studies have also found ambiguous results regarding this issue. See Masson et al. (1998).
Moreover, especially for the interest rate missing observations are a serious problem.
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sponding correlation matrix is provided in Table A.3 in the Appendix. We
assume the variables to be stationary and carefully checked for the occurrence
of outliers.11
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
variable N mean sd min max
Private saving 573 20.582 4.822 -4.396 34.537
Dependency ratio 600 49.723 5.125 36.568 76.015
Income 616 20.558 8.274 5.061 53.364
Inflation 619 5.563 11.599 -4.480 106.263
Government budget 599 -2.357 4.741 -31.312 19.132
GDP growth 623 1.884 2.948 -11.152 10.411
Net foreign assets 625 -16.866 49.976 -165.044 172.894
Source: AMECO, IMF, World Bank
Finally, we introduce three variables that potentially capture cultural and
institutional factors, namely, thrift, trust and religiosity. These are obtained
from the European Value Survey (EVS) for the European countries in our
dataset and from the World Value Survey (WVS) for the non-European coun-
tries. Both datasets are cross-sectional and longitudinal studies that look into
cultural values about beliefs, work, society, preferences and attitudes. Ex-
amples of economic research using the EVS or WVS are Knack and Keefer
(1997), Guiso et al. (2006), McCleary and Barro (2006), Tabellini (2007) and
Tabellini (2010). Typically, country-level cultural indicators are constructed
as the average of individual responses per country. We follow the same ap-
proach, where for each variable we take the average across the different waves
since 1990.
In the EVS and WVS, individuals are shown the following list of personal
characteristics: good manners, politeness and neatness, independence, hard
work, honesty, feeling of responsibility, patience, imagination, tolerance and
respect for other people, leadership, self-control, thrift saving money and
things, determination, perseverance, religious faith, unselfishness, obedience,
loyalty and none. Afterwards, they were asked to choose those five character-
istics that they consider most important to teach their children. We assume
11Using 3-year moving averages of our variables rather than annual observations did not
lead to significantly different results.
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that people who find thrift an important characteristic to pass through their
children tend to save more themselves. We define our variable thrift as the
fraction of the population that has cited thrift in the list above.12 Thus, the
variable is used here as a proxy for the inclination to save in a country. In
Figure 4, we plot the average value of thrift per country versus average pri-
vate saving. We expect higher levels of thrift to be positively associated with
private saving. We can see from the figure that the relationship is positive.
Figure 4: Average Thrift per country
Second, we use a trust indicator in our analysis. We construct the trust
variable based on the EVS/WVS question whether the person agrees with
the sentence ”on average, most people can be trusted”. Our variable is the
proportion of people that responded yes to this question. In our view, this
can be interpreted more generally as the degree of trust in the country and
the country’s institutions (see for example North (1992)). Higher trust is
associated with higher institutional quality, which in turn is hypothesized to
lead to a higher private saving rate. In Figure 5, we show the average values
for trust against average private saving per country. The relation is positive,
though only marginally so.
The third indicator of cultural characteristics relates to the degree of reli-
giosity. The underlying assumption is that participation in a religious group
may foster religious beliefs such as hard work, honesty and ethics (McCleary
12This is similar to the approach taken by Guiso et al. (2003).
8
Figure 5: Average trust per country
and Barro, 2006). These values might in turn increase economic performance
and be positively related to saving. As before, the variable has been con-
structed on the basis of individual answers to questions in the EVS and
WVS. Our religiosity indicator is an unweighted average of four variables
measured in the EVS/WVS: being member of a religious community, believ-
ing in heaven, believing in hell, and visiting religious services more than once
a month.13 In our view, these ”indirect” measurements of religion probably
give a better indication of the religious nature of people. By using four vari-
ables together, we expect to control for different facets of having a religion.
Additionally, we believe that by grouping four different measures into the
creation of one variable, we may be able to reduce self-reported bias.14 In
Figure 6 we show the average ratio of our variable against private saving.
Contrary to our basic hypothesis, the relation is negative.
Table A.4 in the Appendix provides the bilateral correlation matrix of
the three cultural variables and private saving. As suggested by Figures 4 to
6, saving is positively correlated with thrift and negatively with religiosity.
13The bilateral correlations between these four variables range from between 0.5 to 0.7.
14Barro and McCleary (2003); McCleary and Barro (2006) use religious denomination
as an indicator of religion. We prefer our own measure as first, many people are raised
religiously, but have no formal contact with their church in real life leading to severe
measurement error, while second the religious denomination measurement available in the
EVS/WVS may not be representative for the country as a whole.
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Figure 6: Average religiosity per country
The correlation between trust and thrift is significantly negative.
4. Results
In this section we present and discuss the results, moving from a standard
specification with macroeconomic determinants of private saving only, to
extensions using euro dummies for North and South respectively, as well as
variables reflecting cultural and institutional characteristics. Table 2 provides
an overview of the results.
4.1. EMU and euro dummies
Our first goal is to investigate whether the diverging private saving be-
havior between North and South in the eurozone as displayed in Section 2 can
be attributed to differences in underlying economic fundamentals or arises
for other reasons. An example of the first effect would be the difference in
income levels of these countries, as put forward by Jaumotte and Sodsriwi-
boon (2010). Alternatively, differences in private saving behavior can arise
from non-economic factors, such as thrift or trust.
Columns (1) to (3) provide information on this issue. Column (1) con-
tains the results for the pooled OLS regression for all thirty countries in our
sample using the benchmark specification. The benchmark specification is
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a simplified version of Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon (2010) and contains a
limited set of standard macroeconomic determinants of saving.15
In columns (2) and (3) we extend the benchmark specification with two
dummy variables EMU North and EMU South, or two dummy variables Euro
North and Euro South, respectively, similar to Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon
(2010). The dummy EMU North takes a value of 1 for each year a eurozone
country in the North group is part of EMU, while the dummy Euro North
takes a value of 1 for each year a eurozone country in the North group is
part of the eurozone. The same procedure applies for the dummy variables
EMU South and Euro South.16 To avoid multicollinearity, we do not include
the two sets of dummies simultaneously. As we have mentioned in Section 2,
we include Ireland in the South group, following Holinski et al. (2012). The
main reason for our choice is that the current account and private saving
developments in Ireland follow the typical pattern of Southern countries.
Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon (2010) on the other hand regard Ireland as part
of North. As a sensitivity test analysis, we replicate our estimations both
with Ireland in North and excluding Ireland from the sample. Overall, the
results remain qualitatively unchanged.
A few points stand out from columns (1)-(3) in Table 2. First, with the
exception of the coefficient for disposable income, the control variables have
the predicted sign.17 The inflation and growth coefficients fail to reach sig-
nificance, though. Second, inclusion of the EMU dummies (column 2) or
Euro dummies (column 3) leaves the size and significance of the coefficients
on the control variables unchanged. Third, EMU and Euro dummies are all
significant with positive coefficients for the Northern eurozone countries and
negative coefficients for the Southern eurozone countries. These results are
in line with the qualitative findings shown in Section 2 as well as Holinski
et al. (2012) and with the quantitative results in Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon
(2010).18 The significance of the EMU and Euro dummies provides sugges-
15In contrast with Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon (2010), population growth, oil balance,
a financial center dummy variable and a financial liberalization index are excluded.
16For an overview of when each country joined the EMU and the Euro, see Jaumotte
and Sodsriwiboon (2010).
17We also estimated the model including income squared to account for possible dif-
ferences in the effects relative to the income level. However, the coefficient for income
squared was insignificant.
18Similar but somewhat weaker results are found when using the AMECO data that
12
tive evidence of the presence of other factors driving private saving than just
the set of standard macroeconomic variables. In the next section, we there-
fore incorporate three alternative factors that reflect cultural and behavioral
country characteristics in the regression.
4.2. Cultural Variables
In models 3a through 3c (columns 4-6) of Table 2, we report the results
when instead of the EMU or Euro dummies, we include thrift, trust and
religiosity respectively, while in model 3d (column 7) we include all three
cultural variables simultaneously. From model 3a we conclude that thrift
has a highly significant positive coefficient. The significance of the control
variables remains unchanged compared to the previous regressions, but the
size of the control variable effects is reduced somewhat. Moreover, the over-
all explanatory power of the regression is higher than the benchmark and
comparable in magnitude to the regressions that include the EMU and Euro
dummies. The evidence suggests that thrift does provide independent ex-
planatory power for differences in private saving behavior across the thirty
OECD countries beyond the standard macroeconomic effects.
The results for trust are given in model 3b. A positive and significant
effect is found, consistent with our hypothesis and with earlier evidence in
Tabellini (2010). The additional explanatory power of trust compared to the
benchmark equation is smaller than for thrift. The size and significance of
the coefficients on the control variables remain roughly equal in the earlier
models.
The results for religiosity are shown in model 3c. The coefficients of the
control variables are very similar to the coefficients of the previous specifi-
cations. The coefficient of religiosity is significantly negative, implying that
an increase in the degree of secularization is associated with higher levels of
private saving. This is consistent with the bilateral correlation reported in
Table A.4, but goes against our initial expectation that religion is associated
with higher saving.19
include the Eastern European countries. However, in that case only the dummies for
North are significant. This could be due to the similarities between South and Eastern
Europe.
19When we use explicit religious denominations such as the ratio of Catholics and Protes-
tants in society, we still find negative coefficients. This finding goes against Weber’s theory.
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Finally, model 3d incorporates the three cultural variables simultaneously.
We see that the coefficients increase in magnitude for thrift and trust, while
for religiosity it decreases. All coefficients remain significant with the same
sign as before. The overall explanatory power of the regression is about ten
percentage points higher than the benchmark model. The size and signifi-
cance of the control variables remains qualitatively unchanged.
In summary, we are able to show that the cultural variables individually
and jointly significantly contribute to the explanation of cross-country differ-
ences in private saving across countries beyond the standard set of macroe-
conomic variables.
4.3. Culture and eurozone divergence
While regressions 3a-3d document the significant explanatory power of
our cultural variables for private saving in general, they do not in themselves
prove the economic and statistical importance of cultural effects as drivers of
private saving divergence between Northern and Southern eurozone countries.
In columns 3e and 3f we explicitly focus on this issue by including both
the three cultural variables as well as the EMU (model 3e) or Euro (model
3f) dummies in the regression. For both models the dummies for South sub-
stantially decrease in size and become insignificant. For North, no significant
change in the dummy coefficients is seen. We interpret the result as sugges-
tive evidence of the importance of cultural variables in the determination of
private saving in general and of the divergence in private saving behavior
between North and South in the eurozone in particular. Note that the fact
that the main effect seems to come from the Southern countries corresponds
with the observation in Section 2 that the divergence between North and
South after the introduction of the euro is dominated by the dynamics of
private saving in the South. Obviously, more research is required for a better
understanding of our findings. Admittedly, our specification so far is limited
to only three cultural variables where the literature suggests a wide range of
potential institutional variables that may influence economic behavior and
outcomes.20
Barro and McCleary (2003); McCleary and Barro (2006) report similar counter-intuitive
effects of religion on growth. However, they do not provide a convincing explanation.
20E.g. Hofstede (2001); Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2004).
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4.4. Country effects
In this section, we take an alternative route for the analysis of the cross-
country relation between private saving and cultural effects. Instead of a
pooled regression model, we first do a panel estimation of the benchmark
model 1 including country fixed effects. By definition, these country dummies
capture all between variation, including possible cultural effects associated
with private saving.21 In a second step we then relate the estimated fixed
effects to our cultural variables thrift, trust, and religiosity.
Figure 7: Fixed country effects
In Figure 7, we plot the estimated fixed effects against the average pri-
vate saving rate per country. The benchmark country in the regression is
Germany (fixed effect equal to zero). The most important message from Fig-
ure 7 is a clear clustering pattern with suggestive geographical and cultural
characteristics. The Asian countries together with Switzerland are located
in the upper right corner with high saving rates and country fixed effects.
Turkey and Iceland are the biggest outliers in the lower left corner. Given
the idiosyncratic saving behavior of these countries, the corresponding size
of their fixed effects may not be too surprising. The variation in macroeco-
nomic fundamentals may simply be insufficiently large to explain these large
private saving differences.
21The coefficients on the control variables are qualitatively similar to the benchmark in
Table 2. They are available upon request.
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In that respect, the clustering of the middle group with more normal
saving rates in the range of 15 to 25 percent is more interesting. The Scandi-
navian countries and most of the Northern European countries form a joint
cluster relatively high and to the right, while the Anglo-Saxon countries and
the Southern European countries are relatively close together down and to
the left. Focusing on the eurozone countries, we see that most of the North-
ern countries have positive fixed effects, while most of the Southern ones have
negative fixed effects. Italy and France do not seem to comply perfectly with
the hypothesized pattern. Note however that Holinski et al. (2012) using
clustering techniques also fail to find strong evidence that Italy belongs to
the Southern group. Neither do they provide clear-cut evidence that France
belongs to the Northern group.
Overall, the clustering seems to follow well-known geographical and cul-
tural patterns. As such, it provides suggestive evidence of an independent
role for other than macroeconomic drivers of private saving differences.
In the second step, we therefore regress the estimated fixed effects on
each of the cultural variables for the entire set of countries used in Section
2. Figures 8 through 10 graphically show the results.22,23 Consistent with
our earlier evidence we find significant explanatory power for each of the
cultural variables with respect to the estimated country fixed effects. For
thrift and trust the impact is positive, for religiosity it is negative. Especially
the relationships between the variables religiosity and trust and the country
fixed effect are significant. The relationship with thrift is less strong. In our
view, these graphs again are an indication of the potentially large role of
cultural and institutional variables in explaining cross-country differences in
economic outcomes. Furthermore, it is interesting to notice that specially in
the Figures 9 and 10, we see that the countries from North and South cluster
together. The clusters are less clear in the Figure 8.
22Detailed regression results are available on request from the authors. The p-value for
the three cultural coefficients are zero.
23When we plot Figures 8 through 10 with only the European countries, we see that the
fitted values’ lines stay relatively unchanged. This confirms that the relationships we see
represent all data and not only outliers.
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Figure 8: Thrift
Figure 9: Trust
Figure 10: Religiosity
5. Conclusion
According to Holinski et al. (2012) and Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon (2010)
cross-country heterogeneity in private saving behavior is the prime driver of
17
the macroeconomic imbalances that emerged in the eurozone in the period
1999-2007. In this paper, we empirically investigate the determinants of
cross-country saving to shed more light on the heterogeneity between coun-
tries in general and between eurozone countries in particular. Since stan-
dard macroeconomic factors behind saving behavior fail to provide a fully
satisfactory explanation of cross-country heterogeneity, we add a few insti-
tutional and cultural variables to our analysis. In order to check the impact
of these factors, we first use pooled OLS regression on a set of thirty OECD
countries for the period 1990-2010. Additional explanatory variables of pri-
vate saving, next to the usual macroeconomic variables are three cultural
variables: thrift,trust and religiosity. These indicators of cultural and insti-
tutional country-specific characteristics are constructed through aggregation
of individual responses to relevant questions from the European and World
value surveys. It turns out that thrift and trust are significant and have the
expected sign when included in the model that substitute the country fixed
effects for the cultural variables. Although religiosity is significant under the
same setting, it has an unexpected sign.
Additionally, we do a panel country-fixed effects estimation on the same
group of countries and subsequently relate the estimated fixed effects to the
three cultural variables. The results give a picture that is consistent with the
pooled OLS results. First, we observe a clustering of estimated country fixed
effect along well-known geographical and institutional lines. It is possible
to distinguish an Asian group, an Anglo-saxon group, a group of Northern
European countries including the Scandinavian countries and a Southern Eu-
ropean group. Simple regression analysis confirms the existence of significant
relations between the estimated fixed effects and the three cultural variables
both for the group of thirty OECD countries as a whole and for the Eurozone
countries alone.
From our results we cautiously conclude that cross-country heterogeneity
cannot be fully understood when disregarding cultural and historical factors.
For private saving we find a clear and plausible relationship with cultural
variables. More research is necessary to investigate this relationship in-depth,
using a broader set of institutional and cultural variables as well as more
sophisticated estimation techniques.
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Appendix
Data Sources
Table A.1: Country Codes
Country Code Country Code Country Code
Australia AU Hungary HU Norway NO
Austria AT Iceland IS Poland PL
Belgium BE Ireland IE Portugal PT
Canada CA Italy IT Slovakia SK
Czech Republic CZ Japan JP Spain ES
Denmark DK Korea KR Sweden SE
Finland FI Luxembourg LU Switzerland CH
France FR Mexico MX Turkey TR
Germany DE Netherlands NL United Kingdom UK
Greece GR New Zealand NZ United States US
Table A.2: Data Sources
Variable Source
Saving AMECO and WorldBank
Government Saving AMECO and IMF
Government Budget AMECO and IMF
Private Saving AMECO, IMF and WorldBank
Dependency Ratio AMECO
Net Foreign Assets AMECO and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
Real Disposable Income AMECO
Real GDP Growth AMECO
Inflation AMECO, IMF and World Bank
Private Investment AMECO
Current Account AMECO
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